Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1045zbMath0793.90103OpenAlexW2084898521MaRDI QIDQ1308807

Daniel J. Seidmann, Chaim Fershtman

Publication date: 10 December 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ff86666e4597a1a2bbfcf39ca9226cb5693c21da

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingendogenous commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (27)

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