The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-EzbMath0800.90271OpenAlexW1987352215MaRDI QIDQ1309986

Ann van Ackere

Publication date: 20 December 1993

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90234-e

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

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Levitin-Polyak well-posedness for strong bilevel vector equilibrium problems and applications to traffic network problems with equilibrium constraints ⋮ Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract ⋮ Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain ⋮ Price-volume agreements: a one principal/two agents model ⋮ Bilevel Programming: The Montreal School ⋮ Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games ⋮ Product warranty logistics: issues and challenges. ⋮ Percentage rent contracts between co-stores ⋮ An overview of bilevel optimization ⋮ Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard ⋮ Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard ⋮ Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach ⋮ Bilevel programming and price setting problems ⋮ Bilevel programming and price setting problems ⋮ A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.

Cites Work

• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Delegated portfolio management
• Conflicting Interests in the Timing of Jobs
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping

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