Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(93)90159-KzbMath0800.90270OpenAlexW2039211869MaRDI QIDQ1310705

Thomas Hartmann-Wendels

Publication date: 2 January 1994

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90159-k

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers ⋮ Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility

Cites Work

• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Informational Equilibrium
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Economic Comparability of Information Systems

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