An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90149-7zbMath0785.90104OpenAlexW2252373887MaRDI QIDQ1311225

Harold Houba

Publication date: 23 January 1994

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1871/12445

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

The policy bargaining model ⋮ The alternating offer bargaining method under uncertainty ⋮ Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Dynamic negotiation with time-varying Pareto frontier ⋮ Bargaining with asymmetric threat points

Cites Work

• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining