Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90168-CzbMath0800.90304OpenAlexW2036444435MaRDI QIDQ1311269

Anil Arya, John C. Fellingham, Richard A. Young

Publication date: 23 January 1994

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90168-c

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

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• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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