Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
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Publication:1311294
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90206-RzbMath0782.90024OpenAlexW2328959596MaRDI QIDQ1311294
Publication date: 13 January 1994
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90206-r
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