Equilibria of generalized games with \({\mathcal U}\)-majorized preference correspondences

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90209-UzbMath0782.90108OpenAlexW2092734323WikidataQ126298346 ScholiaQ126298346MaRDI QIDQ1311298

Kok-Keong Tan, George Xian-Zhi Yuan

Publication date: 13 January 1994

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90209-u

zbMATH Keywords

qualitative gamepreference correspondencesexistence theorem of maximal elements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (5)

Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games ⋮ Majorized multivalued maps, equilibrium and coincidence points in the topological vector space setting ⋮ Intersection theorems and their applications in general almost convex spaces ⋮ Equilibria of noncompact generalized games with \(\mathcal U\)-majorized preference correspondences ⋮ Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences

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