Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
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Publication:1312239
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1029zbMath0790.90091OpenAlexW2113408885MaRDI QIDQ1312239
Publication date: 31 January 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4533.pdf
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