Evolutionary stability in games of communication

DOI10.1006/game.1993.1031zbMath0793.90096OpenAlexW2568391206MaRDI QIDQ1312241

Joel Sobel, Yong-Gwan Kim, Andreas Blume

Publication date: 16 August 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4530.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

private informationnonequilibriumset-valued stabilityentry resistant setsevolutionarily stable outcomesgames of communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

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