Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
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Publication:1312878
DOI10.1007/BF01075202zbMath0786.90095OpenAlexW2005289028MaRDI QIDQ1312878
Publication date: 5 May 1994
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01075202
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