Little perfection and complexity

DOI10.1007/BF01240128zbMath0799.90137OpenAlexW1968956196MaRDI QIDQ1313357

Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 26 January 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240128

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemmalexicographic complexity costsoff-equilibrium path payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome

Cites Work

• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The strength of a little perfection
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Little perfection and complexity