A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives

DOI10.1007/BF01240129zbMath0793.90101OpenAlexW1555643225MaRDI QIDQ1313359

Edward M. Bolger

Publication date: 26 January 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240129

zbMATH Keywords

games with palyers and alternativeslinear, efficient valuevalue theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (29)

Unnamed Item ⋮ A power index in a simple game with multialternatives ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games ⋮ Multi- and multi-polar capacities ⋮ Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Games with Multiple Alternatives Applied to Voting Systems ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives ⋮ Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games ⋮ Limit Property of a Multi-Choice Value and the Fuzzy Value ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ Bisemivalues for bicooperative games ⋮ The selectope for bicooperative games ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention ⋮ A generalized Deegan-Packel index for multialternative voting games in case of nonhomogeneous voters ⋮ POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES ⋮ A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players ⋮ Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union ⋮ A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives ⋮ Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval ⋮ The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties ⋮ Coalitional values for cooperative games with \(r\) alternatives ⋮ The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives ⋮ Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Cites Work

• Power indices for multicandidate voting games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Values of games in partition function form
• A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• N‐person games in partition function form

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