A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games

DOI10.1007/BF01240130zbMath0802.90133OpenAlexW2032589016WikidataQ122924888 ScholiaQ122924888MaRDI QIDQ1313360

Cheng-Zhong Qin

Publication date: 1 February 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240130

zbMATH Keywords

inner corecompetitive payoff vectorsNTU market game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (10)

On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies ⋮ Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties ⋮ Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies ⋮ Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game ⋮ Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs ⋮ Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games ⋮ The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem ⋮ Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games

Cites Work

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• On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
• Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games
• A further result on the representation of games by markets
• The inner core and the strictly inhibitive set
• A characterization of polyhedral market games
• The Core of an N Person Game

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