Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case

DOI10.1007/BF01240131zbMath0795.90093MaRDI QIDQ1313361

Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 26 January 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingnucleolusprenucleolusnegotiation mechanismsuperadditive 3-player characteristic function gameunique Markov perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus ⋮ Reinterpreting the kernel ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games ⋮ The nucleolus of large majority games ⋮ NON-COOPERATIVE AND AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE AVERAGE LEXICOGRAPHIC VALUE ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Implementation of the \(\tau\)-value ⋮ From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium ⋮ Bargaining and bargaining sets.

Cites Work

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• On the reduced game property and its converse
• A reduced game property for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitarian bargaining solutions
• Non-cooperative games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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