Focal points and bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF01240133zbMath0784.90109MaRDI QIDQ1313367

Chris Proulx, Steven Hsu, Joe Swierzbinski, Kenneth G. Binmore

Publication date: 26 January 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesstrial-and-error adjustment processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game ⋮ Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games ⋮ Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies ⋮ Bargaining with random implementation: an experimental study

Cites Work

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• Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
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• The Bargaining Problem
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• A modification of Harsanyi’s bargaining model
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility
• Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications

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