Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's jury theorem

DOI10.1007/BF01079210>zbMath0800.90046>OpenAlexW2069939192>MaRDI QIDQ1316656>

David M. Estlund

Publication date: 18 April 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079210

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence ⋮ Epistemic democracy with correlated voters ⋮ Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury ⋮ The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting ⋮ Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement ⋮ Democratic answers to complex questions -- an epistemic perspective ⋮ A general jury theorem on group decision making ⋮ A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups

Cites Work

• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
• Unnamed Item

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