Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation

DOI10.1007/BF01079211zbMath0800.90786OpenAlexW2045100013WikidataQ56687819 ScholiaQ56687819MaRDI QIDQ1316658

Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer, Robert Sugden

Publication date: 18 April 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079211

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (19)

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Cites Work

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• Self enforceable paths in extensive form games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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