\(F\)-decomposable social aggregation rules and acyclic choice

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90034-5zbMath0801.90005OpenAlexW1973923986MaRDI QIDQ1317315

V. Pereyra

Publication date: 24 March 1994

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90034-5

zbMATH Keywords

fuzzy setsimple games\(F\)-decomposable social aggregation rulesacyclic social choiceNakumura number

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of fuzzy sets, etc. (03E72) Social choice (91B14)

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