Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
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Publication:1317316
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90035-3zbMath0791.90078OpenAlexW3121253994MaRDI QIDQ1317316
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90035-3
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- The Core of an N Person Game
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