Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1071zbMath0790.90021OpenAlexW1964663511MaRDI QIDQ1317328

Claudio Mezzetti, Gary Biglaiser

Publication date: 24 March 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1071

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectionagent of unknown ability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency Without Communication ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle ⋮ Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword ⋮ Pre-sale information ⋮ Participation constraints in adverse selection models ⋮ A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information. ⋮ Agency in a market setting

This page was built for publication: Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard