An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1001zbMath0790.90083OpenAlexW2244497953MaRDI QIDQ1317334

V. Pereyra

Publication date: 24 March 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059

zbMATH Keywords

stable equilibriumdivinityNWBR equilibriumrefinements of Nash equilibriumtwo-person signaling game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

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