A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1317339
DOI10.1006/game.1994.1006zbMath0790.90082OpenAlexW2059198673MaRDI QIDQ1317339
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1006
Related Items (22)
Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Learning to agree over large state spaces ⋮ Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Rationalizability in continuous games ⋮ Common knowledge and limit knowledge ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Iterated bounded dominance ⋮ Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions. ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge ⋮ The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
This page was built for publication: A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
