Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1317342
DOI10.1006/game.1994.1009zbMath0790.90093OpenAlexW2066612032MaRDI QIDQ1317342
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1009
Related Items (7)
An axiomatization of plays in repeated games ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information ⋮ Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting ⋮ Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ Bargaining power in repeated games
This page was built for publication: Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
