The scope for collusion under fractional defections

DOI10.1007/BF01225930zbMath0800.90345OpenAlexW2127115713MaRDI QIDQ1319268

Dick Damania

Publication date: 12 April 1994

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01225930

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

This page was built for publication: The scope for collusion under fractional defections