The principal-agent problem when the agent has access to outside markets

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90034-AzbMath0800.90268OpenAlexW2046412111MaRDI QIDQ1319630

Gerald T. Garvey

Publication date: 12 April 1994

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90034-a

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Unnamed Item

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