A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90036-CzbMath0800.90267OpenAlexW1973971785MaRDI QIDQ1319634

Shailendra Raj Mehta

Publication date: 12 April 1994

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90036-c

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Some inequalities relating to the partial sum of binomial probabilities
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Unnamed Item

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