Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability

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Publication:1319966

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1016zbMath0790.90085OpenAlexW2064144504MaRDI QIDQ1319966

Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky

Publication date: 21 April 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/933.pdf




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