Second price auctions without expected utility

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1007zbMath0801.90030OpenAlexW2034696624MaRDI QIDQ1321543

William S. Neilson

Publication date: 28 April 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1007

zbMATH Keywords

second price auctionssymmetric equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity ⋮ On the consensus effect ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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