A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1010zbMath0809.90010OpenAlexW1534109342MaRDI QIDQ1321546

Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa

Publication date: 28 March 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1010

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumcore allocationsWalrasian equilibriumaxioms of social choicereplicated economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the price-money message mechanism for economies with satiation ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Walrasian social choice in a large economy ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions ⋮ Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies

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