A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1012zbMath0798.90022OpenAlexW1983948239MaRDI QIDQ1321549

Jonathani Glover

Publication date: 1 November 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1012

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionprincipal-multi-agent model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints ⋮ Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems ⋮ Ignorance in a multi-agent setting ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ Nested frontier-based best practice regulation under asymmetric information in a principal-agent framework

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