Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard

DOI10.1007/BF01242844zbMath0804.90032OpenAlexW2164232487MaRDI QIDQ1322441

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 5 May 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01242844

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibility constraintsincomplete information principal-agent problemoptimal contracting mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Multicriteria decision making on maintenance: Spares and contracts planning ⋮ Existence of optimal auctions in general environments ⋮ Multicriteria modelling of repair contract based on utility and ELECTRE I method with dependability and service quality criteria

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• On fixed point theorems for random set-valued maps
• On pointwise convergence, compactness and equicontinuity in the lifting topology. I
• Minimal Topological Spaces

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