Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
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Publication:1324091
DOI10.1006/game.1994.1028zbMath0811.90003OpenAlexW1981900858MaRDI QIDQ1324091
Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava
Publication date: 18 May 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/65057/
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