The use of costless inspection in enforcement

DOI10.1007/BF01079928zbMath0804.90001OpenAlexW2031183439MaRDI QIDQ1325789

D. Marc Kilgour

Publication date: 12 July 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079928

zbMATH Keywords

punishmentenvironmental regulationcostless inspection processreal-world enforcement problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Optimal Cheating And Inspection Strategies Under A Chemical Weapons Treaty
• Optimal Data Verification Tests
• A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
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