``Eventually revealing repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01240177zbMath0803.90143OpenAlexW2007584351MaRDI QIDQ1327066

Victor C. Domansky, Victoria L. Kreps

Publication date: 15 June 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240177

zbMATH Keywords

finitely repeated gameslack of information on one side

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

On repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information and asymptotically bounded values ⋮ Cyber-Attack Forecast Modeling and Complexity Reduction Using a Game-Theoretic Framework ⋮ Markov games with incomplete information ⋮ Repeated games and multinomial distributions ⋮ In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945--3 March 2021)

Cites Work

• Optimal strategies for the uninformed player
• The normal distribution and repeated games
• On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information

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