Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics

DOI10.1007/BF01240178zbMath0830.92017MaRDI QIDQ1327068

Xiaohua Lu, Dale O. II Stahl

Publication date: 11 July 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumadaptation processnon-surviving strategiesquasi-strict dominancequasi-strict-dominance orderedrelative monotonic dynamicsresponsive dynamicssocial/cultural imitation and learningstrong responsive dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (1)

On the stability of an adjustment process for spatial price equilibrium modeled as a projected dynamical system

Cites Work

• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Evolution, learning, and economic behavior
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
• Average behavior in learning models
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
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