Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1328149
DOI10.1007/BF01238967zbMath0802.90029MaRDI QIDQ1328149
Publication date: 4 July 1994
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection
- Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach
This page was built for publication: Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
