Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)90028-0zbMath0925.90141OpenAlexW1515021144MaRDI QIDQ1329675

Andrew Brociner, Paul Levine

Publication date: 4 September 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)90028-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games ⋮ Is there a tragedy of a common central bank? ⋮ Three-country trade relations: A discrete dynamic game approach ⋮ Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games

Cites Work

• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations
• Recursive Models of Dynamic Linear Economies

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