Group rationality, utilitarianism, and Escher's waterfall

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1032zbMath0803.90132OpenAlexW2004040088MaRDI QIDQ1329900

Kaushik Basu

Publication date: 9 August 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1032

zbMATH Keywords

utilitarianismgroup rationalitymodels of economicswaterfall paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

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The possibility of impossible stairways: tail events and countable player sets ⋮ A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players ⋮ Coercion, contract and the limits of the market

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