Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1033zbMath0802.90122OpenAlexW2043733015MaRDI QIDQ1329901

Richard T. Boylan

Publication date: 9 August 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4430.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstationary pointevolutionary dynamicsregular equilibriaperfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (5)

Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations ⋮ The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games ⋮ Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory ⋮ Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals ⋮ Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation