The epistemic structure of a theory of a game

DOI10.1007/BF01079204zbMath0805.90147OpenAlexW4245945597MaRDI QIDQ1330010

Michael Bacharach

Publication date: 16 August 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079204

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic logiclogical omniscienceformal theory of rational play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

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