The epistemic structure of a theory of a game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1330010
DOI10.1007/BF01079204zbMath0805.90147OpenAlexW4245945597MaRDI QIDQ1330010
Publication date: 16 August 1994
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079204
Related Items
On the logic of common belief and common knowledge, Satisfiability in a Temporal Multi-valueted Logic Based on Z, A FUZZY LOGIC AND DEFAULT REASONING MODEL OF SOCIAL NORMS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES UNDER UNFORESEEN CONTINGENCIES, Game logic and its applications. I, Logic and Game Theory
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Conditional entailment: bridging two approaches to default reasoning.
- Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic
- Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
- On the relation between default and autoepistemic logic
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- A logic for default reasoning
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Backward induction and beliefs about oneself
- Impossible possible worlds vindicated
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- On the evaluation of solution concepts
- On the logic of common belief and common knowledge
- Awareness and partitional information structures
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Levels of Belief in Nonmonotonic Reasoning
