Randomization and the limit points of monopolistic competition

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90006-XzbMath0821.90012OpenAlexW2080705200MaRDI QIDQ1330865

Beth Allen

Publication date: 10 August 1994

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90006-x

zbMATH Keywords

monopolistic competitioncompetitive equilibrialimits of Nash-Cournot equilibriamultiple Walrasian equilibriasequence of replica economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS ⋮ Endogenous formation of security exchanges ⋮ Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies ⋮ On the finiteness of the number of critical equilibria, with an application to random selections ⋮ Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets ⋮ Generic regularity of differentiated product oligopolies ⋮ Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for a two-stage game of asset creation ⋮ Monopolistic behaviors and general equilibrium: A generalization of Nikaido's work ⋮ Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability

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