Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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Publication:1331063
DOI10.1007/BF00193807zbMath0834.90006WikidataQ59972933 ScholiaQ59972933MaRDI QIDQ1331063
Publication date: 18 August 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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