A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
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Publication:1331065
DOI10.1007/BF00193809zbMath0823.90003OpenAlexW2009804024MaRDI QIDQ1331065
Matthew O. Jackson, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 18 August 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00193809
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