Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games

DOI10.1007/BF01247315zbMath0819.90131OpenAlexW1998257175MaRDI QIDQ1332124

Amparo Urbano, Gonzalo Olcina

Publication date: 8 September 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01247315

zbMATH Keywords

introspectionrisk dominant Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games ⋮ A model of noisy introspection.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion, and the Optimal Choice of Portfolio
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

This page was built for publication: Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games