Collusion properties of values
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Publication:1332128
DOI10.1007/BF01247318zbMath0864.90138MaRDI QIDQ1332128
Publication date: 8 September 1994
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (43)
Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification ⋮ Collusion properties of coalition values for games in characteristic function form ⋮ The excess formulations and related results for the normalized Banzhaf index and the Shapley value ⋮ Spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament ⋮ Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: two ways how to allocate the surplus ⋮ Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks ⋮ On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom ⋮ Power allocation rules under fuzzy behavior and multicriteria situations ⋮ NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS ⋮ Balanced externalities and the Shapley value ⋮ Cooperation and sharing costs in a tandem queueing network ⋮ A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games ⋮ Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks ⋮ Axioms of invariance for TU-games ⋮ The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations ⋮ Semivalues as power indices. ⋮ Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ The blocker postulates for measures of voting power ⋮ Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments ⋮ Power distribution in the Basque parliament using games with externalities ⋮ Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Alternative formulation and dynamic process for the efficient Banzhaf-Owen index ⋮ Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization ⋮ A normalized distribution mechanism under multi-criteria situations and fuzzy behavior ⋮ A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BANZHAF INDEX OF POWER ⋮ ON MERGE PROPERTIES OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications ⋮ Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure ⋮ Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes ⋮ The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree ⋮ A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure ⋮ Decomposition of the space of TU-games, strong transfer invariance and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Ordinal cost sharing ⋮ Power allocation rules under multicriteria situation ⋮ Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power ⋮ COMPARING POWER INDICES ⋮ The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities ⋮ Coalition configurations and share functions ⋮ Two Optimal Allocations under Management Systems: Game-theoretical Approaches
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