Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1048zbMath0806.90024OpenAlexW1573288457MaRDI QIDQ1332706

Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson

Publication date: 19 February 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1048

zbMATH Keywords

insurance contractsmonopolistic insurertwo types of risk averse agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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