On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(94)90232-1zbMath0810.90029OpenAlexW2002975096MaRDI QIDQ1333560

Ronald M. Harstad, Michael H. Rothkopf

Publication date: 15 September 1994

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(94)90232-1

zbMATH Keywords

biddingauction design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (14)

Emerging multiple issue e-auctions ⋮ Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ Communication and efficiency in auctions ⋮ Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations ⋮ Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels ⋮ Mechanism design with a restricted action space ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions ⋮ A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels ⋮ EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK ⋮ Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices ⋮ Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments ⋮ Performance evaluation of multi-object auctions

Cites Work

• The discrete bid first auction
• A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding
• An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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