Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1338073
DOI10.1007/BF01213256zbMath0808.90139MaRDI QIDQ1338073
Publication date: 20 March 1995
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (10)
Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ The not-quite non-atomic game: non-emptiness of the core in large production games ⋮ APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO ECONOMICS ⋮ Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- A Tiebout theorem
- Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
- The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
- Cores of partitioning games
- A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities
- Cournot and Walras equilibrium
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Replica economies with congested public goods
- The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
- The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production
- Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Approximate Cores of Large Games
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- Convex Analysis
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem