Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

DOI10.1007/BF01229312zbMath0810.90005OpenAlexW2119929931MaRDI QIDQ1338087

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229312

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designincentive compatibilityincomplete information principal-agent problemsinfinite dimensional setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On the continuity of expected utility ⋮ Robust contracting in general contract spaces ⋮ An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard ⋮ Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system ⋮ Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory ⋮ Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints ⋮ Existence of optimal auctions in general environments ⋮ Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems ⋮ Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard

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