Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets

DOI10.1007/BF01212471zbMath0808.90007OpenAlexW2016999077MaRDI QIDQ1338095

Roger D. Lagunoff

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212471

zbMATH Keywords

free choicechoice processfully endogenous mechanism selectioninfinite regress problemsocial outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

Cites Work

• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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